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Executive Registry

72-4045

19 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Senate Ceiling on FY 73 Laos Funding

1. As requested, I raised the matter of the \$360 million ceiling for Laos at the 19 July meeting of the NSC Ad Hoc Indochina Committee chaired by Mr. Sullivan. In discussing the matter, I was backed up by Mr. [ ] DC/FE, who was also present. We told Sullivan and the assembled members that our understanding of the situation was that the Senate Armed Forces Committee had reported out a Defense Procurement Authorization bill with a \$360 million (Symington) ceiling for Laos which explicitly covered all Laos war-related expenditures, including both military and economic aid, and that the 360 million dollar figure was therefore comparable to the \$429 million FY 73 budgetary projection proposed by the Administration. We made it clear that if this figure stood, the whole Laos program would be gutted and also made clear our belief that unless firm action was taken in the almost immediate future to cope with this Congressional problem, the Symington ceiling was likely to wind up as law which could not then be changed. With all the other items competing for attention during this summer -- the conventions of both Parties, the Presidential campaign, Congressional recesses, etc. -- the Senate might act and the House concur before anyone in the Executive Branch focussed on the problem which, at that point, would become difficult to solve since the Laos ceiling was tacked on to an essential bill the President could hardly veto in its entirety.

2. Mr. Sullivan said State was well aware of the problem and shared our concern. He added that State's view was that it would probably not be wise to attack the \$360 million figure because that was a specific sum which Senator Stennis had personally endorsed and to which he was

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therefore publicly wedded. Instead, State felt the best line of approach would be to try to change the language covering the exclusion features of the proposed legislation. For example, if we could alter the language of the bill so that air support (e.g., the RLAF's T-28's) and the ordnance carried by combat aircraft were taken out of the calculation, the actual ceiling would be much closer to the original \$429 million figure than the public \$360 million figure. The situation could be made even more flexible if the language could be amended to exclude other military items related to the defense of Thailand or furtherance of the effort in South Vietnam.

3. There was some discussion about the wisdom or probable success of pursuing this line of approach, but that is clearly the tack that State wants to take. Sullivan said that Ambassador Johnson was already planning to raise this subject at the 20 July WSAG and asked that the Director be prepared to address this matter from the Agency's perspective when it came up.


4. The discussion of this topic ended with my pointedly reminding the White House representative (Mr. Stearman) that the White House's Congressional Liaison staff was going to have to carry the brunt of the lobbying effort since without a clear, unambiguous indication of Presidential concern, approaches by any individual component or components of the Executive Branch were not likely to be successful.



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Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

cc: Mr. Colby  
Mr. Maury ✓  
Mr. Karamessines



Mr. Briggs

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 127202

SUBJECT: CASE AMENDMENT AND US TENURE IN AZORES

REF: LISBON 2310

1. REFTEL RECOMMENDS DEVELOPMENT OF STATEMENTS ON SIGNIFICANCE AZORES FACILITIES TO US AND NATO DEFENSE FOR USE IN ATTEMPTING DEFEAT CASE AMENDMENT. DOD HAS SUPPLIED GOOD UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT WHICH DEPARTMENT HAS MADE AVAILABLE TO FRIENDLY CONGRESSMEN. ANYTHING WHICH WOULD STRENGTHEN THIS STATEMENT WOULD OF COURSE BE HELPFUL AND DOD IS MAKING EFFORT DO SO. HOWEVER, SENATOR CASE AND HIS SUPPORTERS HAVE SAID THEY DO NOT QUESTION MILITARY IMPORTANCE AZORES BUT SEE ISSUE AS THAT OF CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF SENATE RATHER THAN SUBSTANCE OF AZORES AGREEMENT. (END SUMMARY)

2. DURING JUNE 19 SENATE DEBATE SENATOR CASE SAID "ANY DISCUSSION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE AGREEMENTS IS IRRELEVANT EXCEPT THAT IT INDICATES THEIR IMPORTANCE AND THAT THEY THEREFORE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES AS TREATIES." HE NOTED THAT "OPPONENTS OF SECTION 13 HAVE RAISED SEVERAL ARGUMENTS ABOUT IMPORTANCE TO UNITED STATES OF MILITARY BASES IN AZORES AND BAHRAIN" BUT COMMENTED "I DO NOT DISPUTE THESE ARGUMENTS, BUT I BELIEVE THEM TO BE

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IRRELEVANT TO CENTRAL ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS HAS BEEN FOLLOWED..." DURING SAME DEBATE SENATOR SYMINGTON SAID "THE SENATE COULD AGREE WITH THE NEED FOR US INSTALLATIONS IN BAHRAIN AND THE AZORES; BUT DOES NOT THE SENATE HAVE A RIGHT, A DUTY, TO GIVE ITS ADVICE AND CONSENT ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN TAXPAYERS WHICH THEY REPRESENT?"

3. EMBASSY MAY WISH QUOTE FROM JUNE 19 STATEMENTS BY CASE IN ORDER DEMONSTRATE TO GOP THAT AUTHOR OF SECTION 13 DID NOT INTEND IT AS CRITICISM OF US RELATIONSHIP WITH PORTUGAL. EMBASSY MAY ALSO REASSURE GOP THAT ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN EFFORT STAVE OFF SIMILAR LEGISLATION IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. IF SUCCESSFUL IN HOUSE, ADMINISTRATION WOULD ENDEAVOR HAVE PROVISION STRICKEN IN CONFERENCE. IRWIN  
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 LONDON 6597

*circ file*

*Sec 1-24 20*

SUBJECT: ABSHIRE-CARRINGTON MEETING

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABSHIRE HAD 45-MINUTE MEETING WITH LORD CARRINGTON, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENSE, JULY 14. ABSHIRE BRIEFLY REVIEWED HISTORY OF ADMINISTRATION AND SENATE ACTION ON MANSFIELD'S PREVIOUS PROPOSALS FOR WITHDRAWALS OF US FORCES FROM EUROPE. HE SAID IT WAS ANTICIPATED THAT SENATOR MANSFIELD WOULD INTRODUCE ANOTHER PROPOSAL DURING THE NEXT FOUR WEEKS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH SENATE ACTION ON THE DEFENSE PROCUREMENT BILL. ABSHIRE WENT ON TO DESCRIBE THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY AND THE VARIOUS INFLUENCES AT WORK IN THE SENATE RELATING TO THE TROOPS IN EUROPE ISSUE. WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION WANTED TO AVERT WAS LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES FORMING A COALITION, EACH GROUP FOR DIFFERENT MOTIVES, IN FAVOR OF TROOP REDUCTIONS, SUCH AS HAD OCCURRED LAST YEAR ON FOREIGN AID.

2. VARIOUS ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN AND US POLICY WERE INVOLVED IN THE ATTITUDES OF INDIVIDUAL SENATORS. A FEW CONSERVATIVES, LARGELY FROM AGRICULTURAL AREAS, BELIEVED THAT THE EEC COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY WAS DIRECTED AGAINST US AGRICULTURAL INTERESTS AND, CONSEQUENTLY, WERE DISPOSED TO VOTE FOR TROOP REDUCTIONS IN RETALIATION. SOME LIBERALS CONSIDERED THAT THE

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POLICY OF SEEKING DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE IMPLIED THAT THERE COULD BE A RELAXATION IN THE WESTERN DEFENSE POSTURE. MOST MANSFIELD SUPPORTERS SHARED IN COMMON THE BELIEF THAT EUROPE NATO GOVTS WERE NOT CARRYING THEIR FAIR SHARE OF THE DEFENSE BURDEN.

3. THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT SENATOR MANSFIELD WOULD BE DEFEATED AGAIN. THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION WAS CLEAR THAT THE US POSITION IN EUROPE WOULD BE MAINTAINED. WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION NOW SOUGHT WAS TO SHORE UP SUPPORT IN THE CONGRESS FOR US POLICY. THE PRESIDENT'S SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS OF THE SALT AGREEMENT HAD HAD A BENEFICIAL EFFECT IN THE CONGRESS OF DEMONSTRATING THE VALUE OF LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S NEGOTIATING POSITION. WITH RESPECT TO THE TROOP REDUCTION ISSUE, MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE A SIMILAR INFLUENCE VIS-A-VIS THE SENATE WOULD BE LESS DISPOSED TO VOTE IN ADVANCE FOR UNILATERAL US ACTION TO REDUCE FORCES. FURTHER, ADMINISTRATION POLICY HAD EMPHASIZED THAT THE SALT AGREEMENT ALONE WAS INSUFFICIENT AND THAT THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF A STRONG DEFENSE CAPACITY, INCLUDING THE B-1 AND ULMS, WAS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY COMPLEMENT AND DETERRENT. IN THE NATO CONTEXT, THE PROSPECT OF CSCE CAUSED APPREHENSION THAT A DETENT EUPHORIA MIGHT DEVELOP AND LEAD EUROPEAN NATIONS TO RELAX THEIR DEFENSE EFFORTS. THE US BELIEVED IT ESSENTIAL THAT A DETENTE POLICY BE ACCOMPANIED BY CONTINUED STRONG DEFENSE EFFORTS. AS DETENT AND DEFENSE GO TOGETHER IN THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SPHERE, SO DO THEY GO TOGETHER IN COLLECTIVE WESTERN POLICY.

4. ABSHIRE SAID FINAL POINT HE WISHED TO MAKE WAS THAT EVEN WITH SALT AGREEMENT AND LESSENING DEFENSE EXPENDITURE IN VIETNAM, US PERCENTAGE OF GNP IN DEFENSE BUDGET REMAINED SUBSTANTIALLY LARGER THAN EUROPEAN AVERAGE, A SITUATION OF WHICH THE CONGRESS WAS VERY MUCH AWARE. MOST TROOP REDUCTION PROPONENTS CITED THIS AS MAJOR REASON FOR THEIR POSITION. ADMINISTRATION HOPED THEREFORE THAT EUROPEANS WOULD RECOGNIZE IMPORTANCE OF THIS CONSIDERATION AND DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENHANCE EUROPEAN DEFENSE PERFORMANCE. HE CITED PREVIOUS EFFORTS OF EURO-GROUP WITHIN NATO AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT FURTHER SIMILAR ACTION COULD BE TAKEN.

5. LORD CARRINGTON SAID HE ACCEPTED MR. ABSHIRE'S ASSESSMENT

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FROM US POINT OF VIEW, AND EVEN FROM UK POINT OF VIEW. IT RAISED PROBLEMS, HOWEVER. FIRST POINT HE WISHED TO MAKE WAS THAT IF, HYPOTHETICALLY, MANSFIELD PROPOSAL FOR TROOP CUTS WAS PASSED AND CARRIED THROUGH BY US, THE RESULT IN EUROPE WOULD BE JUST THE OPPOSITE FROM WHAT SENATOR MANSFIELD PRESUMED OR HOPED. ILLOGICAL THOUGH IT MIGHT BE, EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS, WITH EXCEPTION OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE, WOULD REDUCE THEIR OWN DEFENSE EFFORTS. REDUCTION OF US TROOPS WOULD BE TAKEN AS EVIDENCE THAT US CONSIDERED DANGER TO WEST TO BE LESSENING, AND EUROPE WOULD FOLLOW SUIT.

6. SECONDLY, CARRINGTON ASSERTED THAT IN ALL CANDOR HE HAD TO SAY THAT HE SAW ABSOLUTELY NO PROSPECT FOR ANY APPRECIABLE INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE EFFORT. SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE EXPENDITURES WAS NO PROBLEM IN THE UK OR IN FRANCE, BUT THERE WERE REAL PROBLEMS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. THE DANES WERE BECOMING MORE FEEBLE, AND THE BELGIANS AND DUTCH WERE HAVING TROUBLE. CARRINGTON INDICATED THAT HE WAS DEEPLY DISTURBED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN GERMANY WITH THE MOVE OF SCHMIDT AWAY FROM THE DEFENSE MINISTRY. SCHMIDT HAD HELD TOGETHER THE WHOLE GERMAN POSITION ON DEFENSE POLICY AND HE DOUBTED THAT THE SAME COULD BE EXPECTED FROM THE NEW DEFENSE MINISTER. ITALY WAS IN A WEAK POSITION POLITICALLY AND WOULD NOT EXERT ITSELF ON DEFENSE. CARRINGTON NOTED THAT PREVIOUS EFFORTS IN THE EURO-GROUP HAD PRODUCED THE BILLION DOLLAR DEFENSE IMPROVEMENT PACKAGE, BUT HE SAW NO LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS FOR ANOTHER SUCH EFFORT. IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH SCHMIDT, THEY HAD BEEN ABLE TO COME UP ONLY WITH SOME VAGUE IDEAS ABOUT POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATIVE EUROPEAN PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY VENTURES WHICH THEORETICALLY MIGHT RETURN MORE VALUE FOR ACTUAL MONEY SPENT.

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SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 LONDON 6597

SUBJECT: ABSHIRE-CARRINGTON MEETING

7. ABSHIRE REFERRED TO THE PROBLEM OF OFFSETTING US BALANCE OF PAYMENTS EXPENDITURES IN CONNECTION WITH US TROOP PRESENCE AND EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM VIS-A-VIS THE CONGRESS. TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH EXPENDITURES COULD BE NEUTRALIZED PERMANENTLY, ONE OF THE MAJOR ARGUMENTS AGAINST US TROOP PRESENCE COULD BE LAID TO REST. IT WOULD THEN BE POSSIBLE TO ARGUE WITH TROOP REDUCTION PROPONENTS THAT IT COST LESS TO KEEP US TROOPS IN EUROPE THAN AT HOME. ALSO, THE PRESENCE OF US TROOPS UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES COULD BE A POSITIVE INCENTIVE FOR RECRUITING IN A VOLUNTEER FORCE.

8. CARRINGTON NOTED THAT THE OFFSET PROBLEM WAS RELATED TO POSSIBLE EUROPEAN COOPERATIVE PRODUCTION PROJECTS. IN THE PAST, THE OFFSET HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AT LEAST PARTIALLY THROUGH SUBSTANTIAL PROCUREMENT OF AMERICAN EQUIPMENT BY EUROPEAN GOVTS, A PRACTICE WHICH INHIBITED MAJOR EUROPEAN PRODUCTION VENTURES.

9. THE QUESTION WAS POSED TO CARRINGTON WHETHER FURTHER PROGRESS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE ON THE OFFSET PROBLEM THROUGH INCREASED

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EUROPEAN PAYMENT FOR STATIONING COSTS OF US TROOPS. CARRINGTON OBSERVED THAT THE GERMANS PREVIOUSLY ALWAYS RAISED POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THE GENERAL POLITICAL CLIMATE MIGHT BE CHANGING ENOUGH TO WARRANT ANOTHER LOOK AT THIS POSSIBILITY.

10. ON MERR, CARRINGTON ASKED WHETHER THE US WANTED TO TRAVEL OR TO ARRIVE. ABSHIRE RESPONDED THAT ARRIVAL SEEMED TO BE RATHER FAR IN THE FUTURE; HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THE US WOULD NOT BE A PARTY TO AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO WESTERN DEFENSE. CARRINGTON COMMENTED THAT IN THAT CASE THERE WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE AN AGREEMENT. ABSHIRE REITERATED THAT MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WERE IMPORTANT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF DETERRING CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR A UNILATERAL REDUCTION. CARRINGTON INDICATED HIS APPRECIATION OF THIS CONSIDERATION.

11. ABSHIRE SAID THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVED THAT MANSFIELD COULD BE DEFEATED TACTICALLY IN THE NEAR TERM. HE NOTED THAT WITH THE NEW POLITICAL SITUATION WHICH WOULD EVOLVE AFTER THE ELECTIONS IN THE US AND EUROPE LATER THIS YEAR, THE ADMINISTRATION'S PURPOSE WAS TO SHORE UP SUPPORT IN CONGRESS FOR US POLICY IN EUROPE. WITH EUROPEAN HELP, THE US BELIEVED IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO BRING ABOUT GREATER STABILITY AND BROADER UNDERSTANDING OF ESSENTIAL PURPOSES. IT WAS THIS LONG TERM BASIS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SOUGHT TO ACHIEVE.

12. CARRINGTON SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD. DESPITE SOME OF THE UNFAVORABLE TRENDS IN EUROPE, HE THOUGHT THE US SHOULD NOT BE DISCOURAGED. HE SAID THAT BRITAIN WOULD CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE MAXIMUM EFFORT WITHIN THE EURO-GROUP.

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 127194

SUBJECT: CASE AMENDMENT AND US TENURE IN AZORES

REF: NATO 2912

1. SENATOR CASE SPONSORED TWO AMENDMENTS TO FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1972 WHICH BECAME SECTIONS 13 AND 14 OF ACT AS APPROVED BY SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. SECTION 13 WOULD PROHIBIT ALL PAYMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH AZORES AND BAHRAIN BASE AGREEMENTS UNLESS EXECUTIVE BRANCH SUBMITTED AGREEMENTS TO SENATE AS TREATIES FOR ADVICE AND CONSENT. SECTION 14 WOULD DO SAME FOR ALL NEW BASE AGREEMENTS AND ALL EXTENSIONS OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS.

2. IN SENATE FLOOR DEBATE JUNE 19 SENATOR SPARKMAN SUBMITTED AMENDMENT TO STRIKE SECTION 13 FROM ACT, WHICH REJECTED BY 41-36 VOTE. AT NO RPT NO TIME DURING DEBATE WAS THERE ANY CRITICISM OF SUBSTANCE OF AGREEMENTS. OPPONENTS OF SPARKMAN AMENDMENT EMPHASIZED THAT ONLY ISSUE UNDER DISCUSSION WAS ROLE OF SENATE IN FOREIGN POLICY AND NOT RPT NOT IMPORTANCE OF BASES OR MERITS OF BASE AGREEMENTS. EVEN SENATOR CASE COMMENTED: "I THINK I SUPPORT THESE ARRANGEMENTS."

3. JUNE 28 SENATE APPROVED BY 59-30 VOTE AMENDMENT STRIKING BAHRAIN FROM SECTION 13.

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4. HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE BEGAN MARK-UP OF BILL BUT DID NOT FINISH BEFORE ADJOURNMENT. WILL RESUME CONSIDERATION WHEN CONGRESS RECONVENES AUGUST 18. SO FAR NO RPT NO PROVISIONS SIMILAR TO SECTIONS 13 AND 14 INTRODUCED IN HOUSE BUT AMENDMENT BY FRASER SIMILAR SECTION 13 ANTICIPATED. IF SHOULD BE INTRODUCED DEPARTMENT WOULD HOPE COULD BE DEFEATED IN COMMITTEE OR ON FLOOR. ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN ACTIVELY WORKING TOWARDS THIS END. IRWIN  
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